Resource-making controversies:knowledge, anticipatory politics and economization of unconventional fossil fuels by Kama, Kärg
 
 
Resource-making controversies
Kama, Kärg
DOI:
10.1177/0309132519829223
License:
Creative Commons: Attribution (CC BY)
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Kama, K 2019, 'Resource-making controversies: knowledge, anticipatory politics and economization of
unconventional fossil fuels' Progress in Human Geography. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132519829223
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
Checked for eligibility: 20/03/2019
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 29. Apr. 2019
Submitted Paper
Resource-making controversies:
Knowledge, anticipatory politics
and economization of
unconventional fossil fuels
Ka¨rg Kama
University of Birmingham, UK
Abstract
Advancing relational accounts of ‘resource-making’ processes by deploying insights from science and tech-
nology studies, this article outlines crucial new lines of inquiry for geographical research on unconventional
fossil fuels. The exploitation of various carbon-rich substitutes for hydrocarbons has rapidly expanded over
the last two decades, to become a highly contentious issue which augments scientific dissensus and generates
new collective engagements with the subsurface. The article invites geographers to examine the epistemically
and politically transformative potential of such resource-making controversies in terms of reconfiguring: the
production of geoscientific knowledge, anticipation of post-conventional energy systems, and temporal
strategies of (de)economizing extractive futures.
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I Introduction
In response to resurgent concerns about resource
scarcity and energy insecurity, the last two
decades have seen rapid expansion in the devel-
opment of alternative, so-called ‘unconven-
tional’ fossil fuel resources, including lower
grade and hard-to-access oil and gas extracted
from shale basins and bituminous sands.
Impelled by growing recognition that the era of
‘easy oil’ is coming to an end (Bridge and Le
Billon, 2017), diverse carboniferous sediments
of the earth’s crust are now the object of intensive
exploration programmes, and in places have
entered commercial production to reconfigure
both the global energy economy and local ecol-
ogies and livelihoods. The unprecedented rate
and scale at which unconventional sources have
begun to substitute for traditional fossil fuels
offers a timely reminder of the longstanding tenet
in geography and cognate disciplines that
resources are not self-evident or static ‘natural’
entities. Rather, hydrocarbons can be understood
as a relational and transient category, the quali-
ties of which are both purposely reappraised and
intensely contested in accordance with shifting
social needs and values (Bakker and Bridge,
2006; Bakker, 2010; Bridge, 2009, 2011a;
Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). Indeed,
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while continued reliance on conventional fossil
fuels is increasingly questioned in light of the
degrading resource base and adverse effects on
the climate, their replacement with carbon-rich
alternatives is even more contentious, not least
due to higher investment costs and lower energy
returns, difficulties with transferring existing
technological solutions to geophysically and
geoeconomically distant locations, and profound
uncertainties over both the environmental risks
and socio-economic benefits of extraction.
This paper advances non-essentialist, rela-
tional understandings of resources by calling for
critical geographical research to attend more
closely to the controversial forms of scientific,
political and economic practice through which
previously unexplored layers of the subsoil are
constituted as future energy sources. In line with
growing efforts to move beyond established
political economy and political ecology ques-
tions of ‘resource-claiming’, I contend that we
need to critically examine how heterogeneous
geological substances are rendered into know-
able and exploitable resources in the first place,
or ‘resource-making’ (Ferry and Limbert, 2008;
Bridge, 2011b; Kama, 2013; Li, 2014; Richard-
son and Weszkalnys, 2014). Thus, rather than
simply awaiting discovery as higher-quality
stocks become difficult to access, unconven-
tional fossil fuels need to be specifically quali-
fied as worthy of exploitation through targeted
geological prospecting and techno-scientific
experiments, then established as preferable
sources of supply in the realm of energy policy
and markets, and, finally, extracted, transported
and refined into materials suitable for actual
consumption. None of these interventions are
straightforward: their implementation is subject
to conflicting and disputed strategies among
both industry experts and associated regulators
and stakeholders, especially concerning the
take-up of the technology of hydraulic fractur-
ing or ‘fracking’ across the sector. In this regard,
the rise of unconventional energy development
does not so much acknowledge the unlimited
capacity of technological innovation or the invi-
sible hand of the market to overcome resource
scarcity but rather evidences the importance of
wider social debates in challenging the logics of
extractive capitalism and exploring alternative
energy futures beyond the ‘end of oil’. This is
especially the case given that such industries
have now become relocated from the world’s
territorial margins to the midst of Western
democracies.
Yet, at a time when there is a surge to revive
resource and energy geographies (Bridge,
2011b, 2014; Bridge et al., 2012; Calvert,
2016; Huber, 2015, 2018; Zimmerer, 2011), the
making of unconventional fossil fuels and its
effects on the science and politics of resource
development have largely remained under the
radar of critical geographical inquiry, especially
when compared to the burgeoning literatures on
‘public perceptions of fracking’ (see, inter alia,
Evensen and Stedman, 2016; Metze and Dodge,
2016; Thomas et al., 2017; Williams et al.,
2017). While there is an increasingly rich body
of geographical research on traditional fossil
fuel resources and infrastructures, unconven-
tionals are only now beginning to elicit sus-
tained scholarly interest, often triggered by the
grubby realities of commercial exploitation,
such as the bitumen and shale gas booms in
Canada and the USA. Critical research in this
field comprises political ecology analyses of
local environmental hazards, social inequalities
and grassroots resistance associated with expan-
sive extraction (e.g. Christopherson and
Rightor, 2014; Willow and Wylie, 2014; Zalik,
2015b), as well as political economy accounts
of its implications for global energy markets
(Bradshaw et al., 2015a, 2015b; Neville et al.,
2017). The allocation of swathes of land for
fracking, in particular, is often seen as an exten-
sion of neoliberal appropriation of nature,
which engulfs local communities while sustain-
ing the order of the carbon-fuelled capitalist
economy (Fry et al., 2015; Hudgins and Poole,
2014; Mercer et al., 2014). Geographers are now
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also joining other social scientists to address
the dynamics of extractive politics across
scale, noting how such struggles are played out
around competing imaginations of territory
and property, progress and modernization,
social justice and future communities (e.g.
Grant, 2014; Hesse et al., 2016; Kama, 2016;
Sica, 2015; Steger and Milosevic, 2014; Zalik,
2015a). Evading deterministic accounts of
unconventionals as the last resource frontier
(Dannreuther and Ostrowski, 2013; Klare,
2012), this work is beginning to interrogate the
ways in which their exploration is negotiated
and affects resource governance in the context
of prevailing uncertainty and public discon-
tent, to yield often very different outcomes in
different places.
Following this shift of interest from resource
appropriation and control towards more
broadly conceived ‘resource-making’ prac-
tices, here I foreground unconventional fossil
fuels development as an invaluable opportu-
nity to ask new research questions about the
role of scientific disagreements in resource-
making and their potential to transform the
political and economic spaces in which our
collective futures are being worked out. I argue
that critical resource geography would benefit
from joining wider efforts to complement geo-
graphical theory with insights from science and
technology studies (STS) and related develop-
ments in economic sociology and anthropol-
ogy, particularly the work of Michel Callon,
Timothy Mitchell and others. The following
analysis specifically deploys three key per-
spectives from this literature, associated with
the concepts of knowledge controversies,
anticipatory politics and economization, with
the aim to account for the making of new fossil
fuel resources as a collective, indeterminate
and spatio-temporally divergent process. After
elaborating the notion of the ‘unconventional’
as a heuristic for this inquiry, in the next sec-
tions I examine the main implications of
resource-making controversies in terms of
reconfiguring the production of geoscientific
knowledge, the deliberation of post-oil energy
futures and the setup of new extractive econo-
mies. A closely related question is how the
constitution of future resources is bound to the
material differences and dynamics of the sub-
surface, reflecting recent STS-informed
accounts of resource materialities and tempor-
alities on the fringes of anthropology and geo-
graphy (e.g. Bakker and Bridge, 2006; Kama
and Weszkalnys, 2017; Richardson and Wesz-
kalnys, 2014). More broadly, this concern with
subsurface potentialities also aligns with grow-
ing efforts to reinstate the geos as a legitimate
concern for human geography research (Barry,
2013; Clark, 2011; Dalby, 2013; Dittmer,
2014; Elden, 2013, Whatmore, 2006). Empiri-
cally, the analysis takes the lead from my own
research experience on oil shales and shale gas
development in Europe, but it also engages
with recent work on other industries in North
America and elsewhere, whilst acknowledging
that their business logics and socio-political
resonances vary significantly across both dif-
ferent kinds of resources and regulatory con-
texts. However, my aim is not so much to offer
a comprehensive review of recent publications,
but to outline new analytical trajectories for
exploring the epistemically and politically
redistributive effects of resource-making con-
troversies, and their complex engagements
with matter and time.
II The ‘unconventional’: Resource-
making as ontological politics
While the terminology of ‘fracking’ has become
popularized in both academic and public circles,
it is important to note that the category of
‘unconventional’ denotes far more than the sup-
plementary oil and gas flows enabled by hori-
zontal drilling and fracturing of shale basins. In
industry jargon, the term may refer to either
alternative ‘sources’ or ‘places’ of extraction
(Bridge and Wood, 2010). Both means of
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supply have emerged as a substitute for hydro-
carbons derived from easily accessible and
highly permeable reservoirs. Yet, the develop-
ment of unconventional sources, in contrast to
recent attempts at deepwater drilling in the Arc-
tic and other peripheral locations, arguably no
longer exemplifies the geographically expand-
ing character of resource appropriation towards
the Global South and the circumpolar North
(e.g. Bridge, 2009). Reversing the trend of fron-
tier expansionism, these extractive ventures are
aimed at locally available deposits with a wide
range of organic matter content and degrees of
energy return, which have previously either
remained underexplored or deemed sub-
economic for production. In addition to tight oil
and shale gas which have become exploitable
through fracking, unconventional sources
include extra-heavy crude oils, bituminous
sands, oil shales, coal-bed methane, clathrate
hydrates, and other energy-potent sediments
that are widely distributed across the earth’s
crust.1 In this regard, unconventionals are by
no means novel resources. The sheer existence
of such ‘indigenous’ fossil fuel deposits has
long captivated the political imagination of cer-
tain nation-states in their quest for reducing
dependence on energy imports and volatile mar-
ket prices and alleviating the possibility of
depleting conventional supplies. Thus, even
though ‘unconventional’ has now come to serve
as a common denominator for all kinds of fossil
energy substitutes, it is crucial to bear in mind
that these do not amount to a uniform resource
category or even a similar socio-historical phe-
nomenon. Quite the contrary, their exploration
spans distinct technological histories and
political-economic experiments aimed at self-
sufficient energy provisioning, which in the
case of bitumen and oil shales reach back more
than a hundred years, to the very beginning of
the ‘oil era’ (see Yergin, 2009: 7, 178), while
shale gas and tight oil development is more
recent, having largely taken off in wake of the
1970s energy crises (Bradshaw et al., 2015a;
Stevens, 2010). The recurrent consideration of
such fossil fuels in state energy policies is thus
characteristic of attempts to render ‘vertical ter-
ritory’ subject to the building of national iden-
tity and sovereignty (Braun, 2000; Elden, 2013).
Indeed, geopolitical interests in unconventional
energy development have always been under-
pinned by a form of nationalist ‘geologic poli-
tics’ (cf. Clark, 2013).
These techno-politically divergent histories
are closely bound to the fact that unconven-
tional fossil fuels are notoriously heteroge-
neous, even if categorized under a single
name, both in terms of the material composition
and spatial distribution of resource basins. Con-
ventional petroleum is, of course, also far from a
homogeneous substance (Bridge and Le Billon,
2017), but a given unconventional deposit may
encompass sedimentary layers with vastly dif-
ferent geological origins, geochemical and
mineralogical composition, and resultant den-
sity, porosity and permeability. As a result, the
qualities and quantities of the resource may vary
hugely even across the same basin. While this
problem has long been admitted by geologists
and technology developers, it raises insurmoun-
table challenges for the industries’ global
expansion, chiefly for three reasons. First, since
national geological surveys of such resources
have been conducted in relative isolation from
other countries, the material and spatial hetero-
geneity of basins has implied regionally specific
methods for resource assessment and grading,
which in combination with deficient and uneven
drilling data compound difficulties in estimat-
ing the size of the world’s remaining fossil fuel
resources, not to mention technically or eco-
nomically recoverable resources (EIA/ARI,
2013; McGlade, 2012; Mohr and Evans,
2010). Second, depositional heterogeneity com-
plicates the invention of standard extraction
technologies that could be applied to diverse
basins without painstaking customization
(Stevens, 2010). Finally, it also affects the pro-
cessing, distribution and marketisation of end-
4 Progress in Human Geography XX(X)
products, for example, by risking the capacity of
infrastructure such as refineries, processing
plants and pipelines, or by complicating the reg-
ulation of market prices and environmental
liabilities in relation to established fuels (Grant,
2014; Kama, 2013).
To speak of ‘the unconventional’ as some-
thing uniform therefore implies that the differ-
ential qualities and affordances of geological
substances can be subsumed under their sup-
posed family resemblance to oil and gas; or
more precisely, their shared potential to be con-
verted into liquid hydrocarbons upon technolo-
gical manipulation. In light of the issues listed
above, it would be easy to dismiss this account
as misleading. Nevertheless, I propose that crit-
ical scholarship should take issue with this idea
of shared potentiality and specifically trace the
unconventional as something unified, but rather
in the sense of being idealistically constructed
than existentially given in a ‘bedrock naturalist’
sense (Bakker and Bridge, 2006). This is
because the exercise of making sense of hetero-
geneous geological strata as a resource suitable
for exploitation – and a global resource in par-
ticular – necessarily involves their abstraction
as a singular category (cf. McCormack, 2012),
so that they can be conceived as part of a con-
tinuum of hydrocarbons that become available
when higher-quality reserves decline. Indeed,
diverse geological and technopolitical origins
notwithstanding, a common feature shared by
all unconventionals is that their ‘resourceness’
is presumed to progressively take shape across a
temporal horizon, shifting from mere geological
occurrences to definite volumetric appraisals
which are eventually merged with conventional
reserves. As such, the production of bituminous
sands, extra heavy oils and shale-based hydro-
carbons has been growing exponentially over
the last decade and a half, especially in North
America, and is now firmly aligned with main-
stream industry. However, the majority of the
world’s organic-rich formations are conceded
to be ‘not as yet’ commercially exploitable
(cf. Hinchliffe and Bingham, 2008; Wesz-
kalnys, 2014). Worse still, in light of growing
concerns over the destruction of local environ-
ments and global climate, it is disputed whether
the bulk of such deposits should become utilized
at all. That said, by definition, all unconven-
tionals are envisaged to become feasible to
exploit at some point in time, once that knowl-
edge of their properties and technical malleabil-
ity has improved, that political and economic
circumstances have changed, or that hydrocar-
bon availability has become even more con-
strained. What is deemed unconventional
today is thus upheld by the very possibility that
it might indeed become conventional in the not
so distant future.
As a starting point then, the unconventional
can be conceptualized as a liminal resource
category, the essence and significance of which
is either not yet granted or is established only
provisionally. Although many world organic-
rich deposits have long been imagined as an
inevitable successor to the petroleum industry,
their ‘resourceness’ is still in the process of
being assembled via multiple competing efforts
to test the viability and desirability of exploita-
tion (Bakker and Bridge, 2006; Li, 2014,
Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). Indeed, the
designation of diverse sedimentary rocks ‘as
oil’ or ‘as gas’ (Mitchell, 2010) is neither
straightforward nor uniformly conducted across
different geographical localities and socio-
political regimes. To approach resource-
making as a relational and spatio-temporally
differentiated process therefore raises the ques-
tion of who acclaims the epistemic and political
authority to define unconventionals, under what
conditions their efforts succeed or fail and, fur-
ther, in what ways resources come to matter in
association with the generative capacities of
geological materials themselves. In brief, I sug-
gest that resource-making can be considered as
a form of ‘ontological politics’ (Kama, 2016; cf.
Mol, 1999). This implies that resources could, at
least potentially, have been made otherwise or
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even be unmade if circumstances change.
Therefore, we need to examine how certain
enactments of the resource are reinforced at
the expense of other possible ‘resource ontolo-
gies’, which have become either obscured in the
past (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014) or can
still be detected amidst contemporary disputes
over new extractive initiatives, as explained
later.
Further, due to their shifting temporal status
between the present and the ‘not-as-yet’, uncon-
ventionals evidence how resources become cat-
alysts for both deliberate interventions and
contestation around future operations of extrac-
tive capitalism (cf. Barry, 2006; Greenhough,
2016). More precisely, the ontological politics
of resource-making is performative, since it
enables industry and governments to delineate
specific pathways to exploitation, whilst simul-
taneously making it possible for other actors to
resist and divert those pathways. Being, etymo-
logically speaking, something that is ‘not lim-
ited or bound down by convention’, the
unconventional thus serves as the definitional
other for the mainstream. In other words,
through the self-fulfilling prophecy of one day
‘becoming conventional’, as oft-deployed
industry rhetoric puts it, the unconventional
enables the prevailing order to be undermined,
so that it becomes receptive to alternative con-
figurations of resources. Or, as Mitchell argues,
the transmutation of diverse earthly substances
into usable hydrocarbons, both materially and
discursively, requires ‘opening up anew the pol-
itics of nature’ (2013: 252). Drawing on con-
ceptual insights from STS, I now introduce
three novel lines of inquiry inferred by this
approach, before proceeding to detail each in
the next sections.
Firstly, the making of unconventional
resources highlights an acute need for in-depth
studies of the knowledge practices through
which the underground is rendered intelligible
and attributed with specific meanings, qualities
and values (cf. Bridge, 2011a; Robertson,
2012). This directs us to the work of resource
geologists, since it is initially their task to deter-
mine what geological occurrences are worthy of
exploration, before such ‘discoveries’ are con-
figured as assets and commodities that enter the
routines of investment, exchange and produc-
tion. Yet, the process of generating knowledge
on unexplored geological strata is anything but
immune to uncertainty and disputation. Much
like the ‘knowledge controversies’ documented
in environmental and life sciences (e.g. Barry,
2012; Callon et al., 2009; Sarewitz, 2004; What-
more, 2009), geoscientific knowledge claims
have thereby become conflicted across industry
experts and regulatory authorities and, even
more significantly, destabilized through the
interventions of various industry outsiders,
non-specialists and lay publics. What the case
of unconventionals specifically illuminates,
however, is how these shifts in the politics of
knowledge are underscored by contending con-
ceptions and definitions of geological resources.
Such ‘geo-social’ controversies may conse-
quently transform science-policy relations and
generate new political encounters with the
subsurface.
Secondly, geoscientific knowledge contro-
versies are seldom limited to dissensus over
pre-established matters, but rather evidence
how ‘rival technical solutions become experi-
ments in the composition of the collective
world’ (Mitchell, 2013: 240). As such, they
highlight the politics of anticipation at the heart
of contemporary social operations (Adams et al.
2009; Anderson, 2010). Since any attempts to
exploit new fossil fuel resources are prone to
substantial unknowns – both ‘below-ground’
and ‘above-ground’ (Bridge and Wood, 2010)
– it is difficult to predict their success or failure
at the outset, based on either existing trends in
hydrocarbon production or normative calls for
less carbon-intensive energy systems. Rather,
we need to examine how the prospects of spe-
cific industries become informed by competing
constructions of their past legacies and potential
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future benefits and harms against the backdrop
of wider reconfiguration of the carbon economy
(cf. Bridge, 2011b; Mitchell, 2013). Instead of
being solely determined by established scien-
tific and regulatory authorities, the deliberation
of ‘post-conventional energy futures’ (Kuchler,
2017) extends to wider spaces of dissensus
across diverse members of the public, whose
collective identities and political subjectivities
are shaped in the course of the controversy (Cal-
lon et al., 2007).
In this context, and thirdly, I contend that
anticipatory politics of resource-making is
inevitably bound to the question of how such
lower-grade fossil fuels are deemed eco-
nomic to produce, or ‘economized’ (C¸alıs¸kan
and Callon, 2010). Notably, while several
basins such as Bakken shales, Alberta bitu-
minous sands and Orinoco heavy oils have
reached commercial-scale production, other
unconventionals continue to be explored in
marginal industries that are yet to be tested
as part of global market operations. Even in
America, as Zalik (2015a) points out, com-
mercialization is chiefly enabled by a conflu-
ence of geopolitical and financial security
considerations, as corporations seek to shift
their reserve holdings away from riskier fron-
tier locations to familiar regulatory regimes,
with the support of large-scale state subsidies
and abundant investment capital. Beyond
their apparent success, however, many devel-
opers struggle with improving their extrac-
tion techniques and reaching economies of
scale, and even more so with demonstrating
the adaptability of their experiments to geoe-
conomically disparate locations. In any case,
geographical research should be cautious
about adhering to linear projections of tech-
nological innovation and economization,
according to which new commodities can
only be brought to the market once the tech-
nology is fully proven (cf. Mitchell, 2008).
As I discuss towards the end of this paper,
we need to take notice of competing attempts
to economize and de-economize extractive
industries, especially considering the growing
dominance of speculative finance in the
sector.
III Geo-social controversies: The
shifting knowledge polities of
resource-making
Supported by popular fears about an impending
peak in petroleum availability and ensuing secu-
rity risks, industry tends to promote unconven-
tional fossil fuels as the inevitable means to
elongate the path towards the end of oil, perhaps
indefinitely. Insofar as unconventionals are
defined by reference to liquid hydrocarbons,
they acquire the full status as resources when
their production is merged with the mainstream
sector, as it has gradually happened with bitu-
minous sands and shale resources in Canada and
the USA. For the time being, however, their
capacity to mitigate the decline of conventional
supplies cannot be fully determined due to pro-
found uncertainties, including over the layout
and dynamics of the deep subsurface, its sus-
ceptibility to technological interventions, and
the long-term impacts of these interventions
on both the environment and human health.
Limited understanding of geological propensi-
ties makes it difficult to evaluate both the size of
recoverable resources and associated technical
and environmental risks, which is further com-
pounded by the heterogeneity of world deposits.
Equally, the outlooks of any industry are subject
to indeterminate geopolitical developments
around international markets and climate poli-
cies (Bradshaw et al., 2015b; IEA, 2011). Given
these combined uncertainties, policymakers and
regulators are left to navigate between deficient
and conflicting assessments, which in turn
become routinely challenged by competing
claims to expertise, particularly with regard to
less-explored basins. The lack of reliable
knowledge has thus given way to intense and
increasingly polarized disputes, including over
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the legitimacy and longevity of the North Amer-
ican boom (Ko¨k-Kalaycı, 2016; Zalik, 2015b)
and the spread of fracking to other regions, most
notably Argentina, Australia, China and Europe
(Kuchler, 2017; Mercer et al., 2014; Neville
et al., 2017). In the European Union, these dis-
agreements have become so widespread and
fuelled local opposition to the extent that sev-
eral states have now suspended exploration or
banned fracking altogether.
While the implications of growing public dis-
content for governance and participatory
decision-making are increasingly studied from
environmental psychology and social justice
perspectives (e.g. Cotton, 2016; Evensen and
Stedman, 2016; Whitton et al., 2017), it is less
noted how such controversies disclose a dearth
of both expert consensus and public trust in the
geosciences. Drawing on STS approaches to
knowledge controversies, I suggest that while
disputes are integral to the conduct of science,
their overspill to the public sphere holds signif-
icant potential for the democratization of geol-
ogy and associated disciplines, in the sense that
it necessitates both a reconfiguration of the pro-
cesses of specialist knowledge production and
new modes of citizen engagement with the
expertise at stake (e.g. Callon et al., 2009; Chil-
vers and Kearnes, 2016; Whatmore, 2009).
Expert calculations of potentially exploitable
resources or resulting geophysical hazards, such
as fugitive methane and induced seismicity, are
thus no longer taken for granted, but rendered
open to wider interrogation, contestation and
politicization. Moreover, there is no clear divide
between expert and non-expert knowledge,
since specialists from other disciplines and sec-
tors as diverse as environmental sciences, eco-
nomics and public health increasingly scrutinize
industry expertise, along with a growing array
of civil society groups, affected communities
and even laypersons. As long noted in STS, such
concerned groups cannot be silenced with more
education – as presumed by the ‘public deficit’
of knowledge perspective that so often informs
governmental consultation practices – but they
contribute their own knowledge claims, value
judgements and firsthand experiences to the dis-
pute (Espig and de Rijke, 2016; Lis and Stasik,
2017; Lis et al., forthcoming; see also Chilvers
and Kearnes, 2016). Furthermore, one could
argue that the divergence of such ‘knowledge
polities’ enables the geological domain to be
conceived and acted upon in different ways,
with the result that subterranean matters them-
selves acquire differential political capacities
(cf. Whatmore, 2013). What can be termed
more specifically as geo-social controversies
therefore comprise a series of collective engage-
ments with subsurface potentialities, enlisting
both human and non-human agencies.
Traditionally, the making of extractive
resources has converged upon nationally
appointed institutions of geoscientific expertise,
most notably state-run geological surveys and
their counterparts. Working alongside commer-
cial consultancies and industry geologists, it is
the preserve of these ‘centres of calculation’
(Latour, 1999) to develop methods for visualiz-
ing the otherwise invisible bowels of the earth
and to consolidate evaluations on resource
availability and technological readiness,
although the division of labour between
different epistemic communities may vary sig-
nificantly between countries. As ongoing prob-
lems with calculating shale energy resources
indicate, however, such representations of the
subsoil are always provisional and subject to
diverse forms of specialist interpretation which
remain invariably disputed (Kama and Kuchler,
2019; Kuchler, 2017; McGlade et al., 2013; see
also Valdivia, 2015). This is exacerbated by
longstanding discrepancies between geological
and economic estimates of exploitable
resources across the hydrocarbon sector (Mitch-
ell, 2013; Wood, 2016). In this regard, contro-
versies in the geosciences can be seen as a norm
rather than something specific to unconven-
tional fossil fuels. Yet, it is important to note
how the development of suitable ‘geometrics’
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(Elden, 2013) for unconventionals has taken
place in close association with the invention of
particular extraction technologies and their
painstaking adaptation to the specificities of the
local resource base (Hemmingsen, 2009; Kama,
2013; Ko¨k-Kalaycı, 2016). Subsoil heterogene-
ity therefore sets important limitations for any
estimates of both ‘ultimately available’ in-place
stocks, not to mention technologically or eco-
nomically recoverable resources, and especially
reserves which are even more difficult to calcu-
late due to the fact that they also incorporate the
unknown, yet-to-be-discovered stocks which
are projected to become available by inference
to known accumulations. However, the
expected end result is still a uniform methodol-
ogy for the assessment and grading of different
resource categories with decreasing degrees of
probability, including proven, probable and
possible reserves, which is underscored by the
assumption that world deposits are largely ana-
logous to each other (Bowker, 1994; Kuchler,
2017). Following STS terminology, local
methodological intricacies consequently
become ‘black-boxed’ and codified, in order
to render them comparable across distinct
‘metrological regimes’ (Barry, 2006), espe-
cially around more prominent calculative cen-
tres such as the US Geological Survey, whose
methodology sets the standard across the
world. In the case of Alberta bituminous sands
and Orinoco heavy oils, this metrological
labour culminated with the highly publicized
and controversial merger of unconventional
deposits with the world’s proven oil reserves
in 2002 and 2007 respectively, although they
remain separately measured.
More fundamentally, the degree of standar-
dization that occurs across industry conceals
how divergent epistemologies of resource
assessment rely on locally specific conceptions
of the resource or ‘resource ontologies’.
Defined as ‘assumptions about what resource
substances are, their affordances, and what sus-
tains them’ (Richardson and Weszkalnys,
2014: 19), alternative resource ontologies may
either have become historically obscured, or
indeed co-exist until the present day. A striking
example here is the juxtaposition of ‘oil sands’
and ‘tar sands’ as two competing discourses of
economic panacea and socio-ecological
hazard, which delineate debates around uncon-
ventional oil production in Canada (Grant,
2016; Zalik, 2015b). Another example is oil
shales which until this day continue to be con-
ceived differently in different countries as both
a solid mineral ore and a liquid hydrocarbon
resource, whereas either categorization implies
distinct and largely incompatible methods of
assessment as well as contending socio-
political enactments of the resource (Kama,
2013, 2016). Similarly, the exploitation of
shale- and coal-based methane blurs the dis-
tinction between solid and liquid resources,
especially with regard to legal discourses of
property rights and resource allocation (Hesse
et al., 2016).
The extent to which these geometrics are
locally contingent and associated with specific
resource ontologies becomes evident when
extraction technologies are transferred from
established industries to distant resource basins.
What has supposedly ‘worked’ in one place
does not necessarily count as a self-evident
solution in another context, as recent struggles
with moving fracking to Europe make acutely
clear (Lis and Stankiewicz, 2016; Vesalon and
Cret¸an, 2015; Williams et al., 2017). As a result,
technology transfer may both augment existing
scientific disputes and render any disagree-
ments subject to public scrutiny. In this situa-
tion, the prospects of exploitation cannot solely
be decided by expert estimates of recoverable
resources or industry-government negotiations
over regulation and revenue distribution, thus
exposing the limits of technocratic approaches
to resource governance. For those at the receiv-
ing end in Europe, the claim that fracking has
already proven a viable energy solution in the
USA does not automatically justify its
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implementation in their vicinity, regardless of
whether local populations have much experi-
ence with extractive industries. As recent anal-
yses of EU ‘anti-fracking’ protests show,
distinct democratic habits and regulatory
demands make it difficult for the most experi-
enced companies to gain exploration rights; and
even if they do, this does not necessarily imply a
‘social licence to operate’ (Bradshaw and
Waite, 2017; Lis and Stasik, 2017; Vesalon and
Cret¸an, 2015). At the same time, the EU author-
ities have explicitly pledged not to follow the
American ‘revolution’ and instead advocate a
cautious ‘evolution’ by developing a local
knowledge base on the subject before deciding
whether shale should become a resource for
Europe (European Parliament, 2014).
Conversely, there is also some evidence to
suggest that the prospect of technology transfer
has simultaneous effects upon the host industry,
as it reopens previously black-boxed resource
ontologies. Here, my recent study of oil shales
production in Estonia shows how the industry’s
aspirations to capitalize upon local technologi-
cal expertise and export its carbon-intensive
technology to the USA and Middle East have
stirred up a hornet’s nest of socio-political ago-
nies over national energy sovereignty which had
hitherto remained largely suppressed (Kama,
2013, 2016). In the course of renewed contesta-
tion, the relatively isolated problem of the state
energy mix has become rehearsed as part of
global political and moral dilemmas of sustain-
ing the oil-fuelled capitalist economy. Such
‘issue linkages’ are also noted to be common
to controversies surrounding other unconven-
tionals (Neville and Weinthal, 2016; Neville
et al., 2017).
Either way, geo-social controversies effec-
tively work to de-essentialize established
notions of resources and multiply concerns with
subsurface potentialities beyond the confines of
scientific institutions and the in-house expertise
of industry. These controversies thus open up a
broader question of how ‘vertical territory’ is
rendered intelligible and acquires agentive
capacities in ways that mobilize a wide array
of everyday political agencies, beyond the codi-
fied techniques of traditional geopolitical actors
(Barry, 2013; Dittmer, 2014; Elden, 2013;
Squire, 2016). This can also be considered as
a form of subterranean geopolitics (Valdivia,
2015). To date, such diversification of geopoli-
tics has most visibly involved coordinated
attempts by well-established NGO coalitions
to identify and report select instances of contra-
dicting evidence sourced from both published
research and local witnesses. By mobilizing
concrete examples, NGOs are able to associate
local issues with more global campaigns
(Neville and Weinthal, 2016), effectively dis-
crediting the ‘scientization’ of the issue on
behalf of industry protagonists by way of a
‘logic of abduction’ (cf. Barry, 2013). This may
easily turn into a tug-of-war between various
mobilizations of evidence and counter-
evidence, which serve to corroborate certain
storylines of desired futures, but do not actually
facilitate meaningful debate (Espig and de
Rijke, 2016; Lis et al., forthcoming; Metze and
Dodge, 2016). In this way, civil society activists
primarily work to augment, communicate and
reroute the scientific controversy, without
necessarily contributing much original knowl-
edge on the geos. The influence of such ‘coun-
ter-expertise’ (Beck, 1995) therefore hinges on
the credibility of NGOs to act as spokespersons
for alternative resource ontologies, as well as to
simulate industry experts by adopting their tech-
nical and financial lexicon and navigating the
corridors of policy capitals similarly to profes-
sional lobbyists. That said, other concerned
groups may prefer to confront extraction with
their own vocabularies and experiential knowl-
edge, as recent actions taken by Native Amer-
ican communities make clear (e.g. Willow,
2016; Zalik, 2015a). It is in this regard that we
can witness the influx of more original geo-
expertise. On occasion, this may be aided by
critical scholars whose work is deliberately
10 Progress in Human Geography XX(X)
aimed at co-producing environmental monitor-
ing data with affected communities, such as the
WellWatch (Wylie and Albright, 2014), Citizen
Sense (Gabrys, 2017) and Watershed Knowl-
edge Mapping (Kinchy, 2017) projects around
the Marcellus shale boom in the USA.
Overall, geo-social controversies illuminate
not just the shifting politics of geoscientific
knowledge production, but wider spaces of dis-
sensus emerging around the prospects of the
carbon economy. In this regard, the case of
unconventionals links STS-led controversy
studies with geographical research on the
future, which has so far focused mostly on gov-
ernmental exercises of emergency planning,
scenario-building and similar ‘anticipatory
knowledge practices’, especially regarding bio-
security (e.g. Anderson, 2007, 2010; de Goede
and Randalls, 2009; Hinchliffe and Bingham,
2008). However, since efforts to govern vertical
territory are plagued by profound uncertainties,
post-oil energy futures cannot simply be
mapped out and calculated as ‘possible states
of the world’ (Callon et al., 2009). Instead, their
radical openness calls for critical engagement
with more distributed anticipatory politics
which exceed traditional accounts of the geopo-
litics and governance of resources.
IV Anticipatory politics: The
democratic potential of
deliberating post-conventional
energy futures
While the production of shale-based hydrocar-
bons, bituminous sands and heavy oils in the
Americas is growing rapidly, various other
kinds and locations of lower-grade, carbon-
rich fossil fuels remain ‘not as yet’ exploitable
and they may in reality never be taken out of the
ground due to the need to curb global emissions
(McGlade and Ekins, 2015). It is difficult to
predict even the prospects of those industries
already in operation, because this hinges on a
range of post-oil futures under contemplation as
part of the ongoing reconfiguration of the car-
bon economy (Bridge, 2011b; Mitchell, 2013).
Nevertheless, unconventional fossil fuels con-
tinue to be perpetuated by both national dis-
courses of energy sovereignty and companies’
investment portfolios in the anticipation of
abundant supply and monetary gain. This is
especially the case since unconventionals do not
merely epitomize the progressive expansion of
capitalism to previously underexploited parts of
nature – from ‘easy oil’ to ‘extreme oil’ (Klare,
2012) – but have in fact always shadowed the
hydrocarbon industry as ‘resources of the
future’. The lure of such future resources is thus
not entirely virtual but corroborated by the pres-
ence of vast sedimentary deposits, as well as by
longstanding technological experiments with
materializing this ‘geological potential’ (cf.
Weszkalnys, 2015).
To advance the conceptualization of a liminal
resource category, the unconventional can be
understood as a complex interplay of both com-
peting ‘anticipations’ of the future potentialities
of resource materials and ‘retentions’ of their
complex techno-political histories (Barry,
2014; Born, 2009; Kama, 2016; Kama and
Weszkalnys, 2017; Weszkalnys, 2014). Follow-
ing a Husserlian conception of time, neither of
these temporal modalities can be accessed in
and of themselves. Rather, both anticipations
and retentions are constructed as they converge
in the present moment, being strategically
deployed by industry and its proponents to legit-
imize continued prospecting and licensing of
concessions – and likewise by others to chal-
lenge these investments. Select examples of
purportedly successful exploitation, transposed
either from the industry’s distant past or from a
faraway geographical location, are thereby
acted upon as an already existing index of a
future energy economy to come. So, even
though the bulk of such geological endowment
– including entire resource categories such as oil
shales and clathrate hydrates – remains unrea-
lized as something that ‘has not and may never
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happen’, through the promissory logic of one
day becoming conventionalized it nevertheless
has very real consequences in the here and now,
as specific futures associated with exploitation
are continuously ‘made present while remaining
absent’ (Adams et al., 2009; Anderson, 2010:
783; de Goede and Randalls, 2009). This
‘potential politics’ of resource-making (cf. Mas-
sumi, 2007) thereby comes to bear genuine
effects on the design of national energy policies,
infrastructural networks and markets, perturb-
ing the choice between high- and low-carbon
pathways as a ‘fluid, unproblematic, unviolent
transition’ (Boyer, 2011: 5). A good example of
this predicament is the widespread promotion of
shale gas as a ‘bridge fuel’ which alongside
conventional gas is alleged to facilitate decar-
bonization despite much controversy over fugi-
tive emissions. This is particularly evident in
Europe where the industry has become subject
to conflicting strategies of energy securitization
and risk management without even moving
beyond the exploration stage.
The dilemma of whether unconventionals
ought to have any significant role in the energy
mix thus invokes a ‘realm of latent futures in the
making’ (Adam and Groves, 2007: 17). For
Adam and Groves, latency refers to virtual and
unpredictable, yet irreversible environmental
harms, including those unleashed by penetrating
the deepest layers of the subsurface. Extending
their concept, I posit that there are multiple
‘latent future presents’ encoded in the carbon
economy and continuously unfolding, even if
never fully materialized, in the sense that the
industry has been populated by a myriad of
competing resource imaginaries since the very
inception of scarcity and, later, the twin con-
cerns of ‘peak oil’ and climate change. Most
notably, these latent futures take on ambiguous
meanings as both a threat of calculable risks and
incalculable hazards, and a promise of future
opportunities and profit; or as Anderson
remarks, ‘both that which must be secured
against and that which must be enabled’
(2010: 782). In other words, it is precisely the
distinction between desirable and undesirable
possibilities which is at stake in the anticipatory
politics inherent to geo-social controversies.
This concurs with the argument that antici-
patory politics should be approached more
broadly as a ‘space of contestation and dissen-
sus’ in which possible futures are codified and
rendered actionable by a host of social actors
(Kinsley, 2011; see also Barry, 2001). Attend-
ing to these unfolding politics makes it neces-
sary to investigate the competing rationales
and modes of action which mediate the delib-
eration of unconventional energy development
– specifically, how such ‘anticipatory logics’
(Anderson, 2010) are forged in a confluence
of indefinable futurities and deliberate invoca-
tions of the past. Recent studies of fracking
and oil sands reveal, however, that logics such
as precaution, prevention, preemption and pre-
paredness are no longer exercised by regula-
tory and industry circles alone (Fleming and
Reins, 2016; Grant, 2014; Kinchy, 2017).
Instead, their authority to speak for ‘future
presents’ is challenged by various other
experts and non-experts, who may hold very
different perceptions and epistemes of time
(Bear, 2016; Szolucha, 2018). Such interven-
tions convey a sense of democratic openness
which cannot be projected from the ‘public
deficit’ perspective – ‘a future-orientated tem-
porality that refocuses attention away from
people’s inability to engage on the terms that
science chooses, and enables lay knowledges
that are not temporally structured in the same
way’ (Brace and Geoghegan, 2010: 292,
emphasis added). As noted, these lay knowl-
edges are not necessarily removed from expert
knowledge production, but may importantly
traverse established modes of epistemic
authority (see also Gabrys, 2017).
As such, geo-social controversies unveil a
‘crisis of democracy’ where it is unclear whose
anticipatory knowledge counts and who gets to
establish the consequences of this knowledge in
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deciding over the trajectories of the energy sec-
tor (Steger and Milosevic, 2014). Ongoing
struggles over epistemic and political authority
may consequently challenge science-policy
relations or the devolution of power between
national and subnational authorities, as the cur-
rent stalemate in UK shale gas development
reveals (Bradshaw and Waite, 2017). But even
more significantly, the proliferation of protest
campaigns around prospective extraction sites
illuminates how ‘fracking has the capacity both
to fracture formerly cohesive communities and
to bring formerly disparate communities
together’ (Willow and Wylie, 2014: 227). Simi-
larly to widespread contestation of bituminous
sands in Canada, the ‘anti-fracking’ fronts on
both sides of the Atlantic reshape the social
fabric by giving rise to divided and often irre-
concilable public concerns, which cannot be
occluded by narrowly designed calculations of
environmental safety and techno-economic fea-
sibility, but reveal, more fundamentally, histori-
cally wedged social inequalities, distrust of
political regimes and desired modes of future
collective life (Espig and de Rijke, 2016; Fry
et al., 2015; Lis and Stankiewicz, 2016; Sica,
2015; Steger and Milosevic, 2014; Thomas
et al., 2017; Williams et al., 2017). Despite
being loosely defined, such ‘political situations’
(Barry, 2012) show tremendous potential to
mobilize resistance across all segments of soci-
ety, from the usual suspects of NGOs and green
parties, to the farming and indigenous commu-
nities affected by exploration, to local health
practitioners and ‘Lancashire Nanas’ represent-
ing the rights of future generations (e.g. Szolu-
cha, 2016; Willow, 2016). Their emergence
thus affirms the STS concept of ‘issue-politics’,
where shared concerns over novel technological
inventions are noted to generate new collective
identities and political subjectivities across
diverse actors who otherwise have very little
in common (Callon et al., 2009; Latour, 2005;
Marres, 2005).
Like other knowledge controversies, the
epistemic and moral struggles of deliberating
post-conventional energy futures are best
approached as ‘generative events’ – not just
because they give voice to alternative knowl-
edge polities, but because they give birth to new
publics (Whatmore, 2009). As Whatmore cau-
tions, however, this democratic potential is ‘nei-
ther automatic nor guaranteed’, since it
corresponds to ‘situated achievements’ which
need sustained effort and experimentation for
any social change to be achieved (Whatmore
and Landstro¨m, 2011: 604). As the controversy
takes its course, some newly-defined stake-
holder groups may indeed come up with alter-
native proposals for energy provision alongside
– or even in opposition to – the grand policy
imaginaries of energy security and technologi-
cal modernization that prevail amongst so many
resource-holding governments. Yet, the capac-
ity of these emergent ‘energy publics’ to make a
difference should in no way be taken for
granted, especially when confined within for-
mal practices of consultation (Chilvers and
Kearnes, 2016; Pallett et al., 2017).
Further, it is crucial to avoid here binary
characterizations of pro- and anti-extraction
publics – the popular depiction of ‘proponents’
and ‘opponents’ which implies that the two
camps exhibit clearly-defined identities and
agendas. Rather than enabling actors to speak
from fixed positions, the plurality of issue def-
initions and futurities at stake necessitates con-
stant cross-examination of evidence between
partisan groups, so that no clear-cut division is
always evident – or at least not before the con-
troversy is (temporarily) settled. Quite the con-
trary, oppositional framing may in fact be a
deliberate strategy undertaken by state-
industry allies in order to discredit dissenting
anticipatory knowledges as incompetent, irrele-
vant or outright dangerous (Hudgins and Poole,
2014; Kama, 2016; Lis and Stankiewicz, 2016).
Similarly, those who contest extraction often
mobilize counter-evidence with the sole aim to
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influence the framing and trajectory of the con-
troversy (Metze and Dodge, 2016; Neville and
Weinthal, 2016). Nevertheless, beyond mere
antagonism (cf. Mouffe, 2005), widespread
resistance to new extractive projects in estab-
lished democratic contexts arguably puts into
motion more productive processes of identity-
and place-building, as manifested in the
declaration of a growing array of localities as
‘frack-free’ (Fry et al., 2015; Neville and
Weinthal, 2016; Short and Szolucha, 2019).
Insofar as these fragmented yet increasingly
translocal movements continue to explore alter-
native social values, energy citizenships and
intergenerational justice, they conjoin the inco-
herent and indeterminable but nonetheless uni-
fying impetus of contemporary environmental
resistance (see Ansems de Vries and Rosenow,
2015). An urgent analytical task is hence to
explore what geopolitical collectives are impli-
cated by such pre-emptive freedom from extrac-
tion, and to what extent their emergence makes
it possible to disrupt established knowledge-
power relations.
Here, a key point of dispute is whether
unconventional fossil fuels ought to become
economically feasible to exploit. As elaborated
next, this represents a third register of resource-
making controversies, where concerns around
‘below-ground’ indeterminacies intersect with
‘above-ground’ strategies of resource appro-
priation, pricing and speculation. The following
therefore develops the relational conceptualiza-
tion of unconventionals as a product of a series
of collective future-oriented practices, which
include the restructuring and decarbonization
of energy sectors and, increasingly, financiali-
zation of extractive industries.
V Economization: Divergent
temporal politics in materializing
new extractive industries
By definition, the notion of unconventionals as
a liminal resource category indicates that such
‘resources of the future’ portend to become one
day indeed exploitable. In practice, however, it
is more than doubtful whether all such geologi-
cal occurrences will be commercially produced
and incorporated within conventional reserves,
especially as current states of exploration vary
significantly across different basins. That said,
it is important to bear in mind that unconven-
tionals do not correspond to entirely novel or
recent phenomena, since smaller-scale experi-
ments with producing alternative fossil fuels
have long endured on the borderlands of main-
stream extractive economies. Even as bitumi-
nous sands and shale-based hydrocarbons have
turned into a multi-million dollar business, the
desire to harness their energy content has occu-
pied governments and technology developers
for many decades, including at times when mar-
ket prices were at their lowest (Hemmingsen,
2009; Ko¨k-Kalaycı, 2016). Furthermore, their
commercialization in North America can be
explained as a place-specific response to geopo-
litical and economic security concerns – insti-
gated by close allies of the state, industry and
finance capital – rather than the logical end
result of sustained innovation and high prices
(Wood, 2016; Zalik, 2015a). Although these
extractive ventures are now transgressing to
other parts of the globe, to reinvigorate hopes
for self-sufficient energy provisioning, they
have so far proven notoriously difficult to
implement beyond the immediate proximity of
established industries and boomtown cultures.
Meanwhile, lower-grade unconventionals such
as oil shales have persistently failed to acquire
the status of a global resource despite century-
long efforts to capitalize on their potential.
This remarkable endurance of unconven-
tionals as future resources, which may or may
not become eventually exploited, begs for the
question of what it actually means for these
resource economies to be economic (Callon
et al., 2007). Following the STS-led economic
sociology of Callon and others, ‘to be eco-
nomic’ can be understood as the product of a
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wide range of social techniques that are aimed at
rendering something internal to the frame of
economic calculation or, briefly, ‘economiza-
tion’. As a ‘process that is historical, contingent
and disputable’, economization and its out-
comes are subject to intense ‘trials of strength’
which enlist various competing economic prac-
titioners, but also their technical and institu-
tional settings and the materiality of things
entering valuation and market transactions
(Callon et al., 2007: 3; C¸alıs¸kan and Callon,
2010). What Mitchell (2013) identifies as the
‘new politics of nature’ inherent to the making
of unconventionals therefore depends foremost
on how the carbon economy will be collectively
reworked vis-a`-vis the material properties of the
changing resource base and the associate infra-
structures through which such new commodities
are circulated (such as ‘dilbit pipelines’; see
Grant, 2014). Rather than being predetermined
by the course of ‘the market’ as having some
universal form of existence, economization is
arguably co-performed by a variety of human
and non-human agencies, yielding distinct out-
comes in different places and times.
Following this approach, a key question is
not so much whether unconventional energy
development overall coheres with existing
mechanisms of extractive capitalism, but in
what ways particular projects interfere with the
design of regional economic regimes. Uncon-
ventionals, like any hydrocarbons, are always
‘inserted into a very specific localized [ . . . ]
political economy even if the properties of the
wider oil assemblage are in some sense normal-
ized’ (Watts, 2013: 1018). For example, the
exploitation of extra-heavy crudes in Venezuela
and oil shales in Estonia, Brazil and China is
inextricably entangled with nationalist energy
policies and cross-subsidized by other heavy
industry, to the extent that their operations are
at odds with free market imperatives (Bradshaw
et al., 2015a; Kama, 2013). Whilst being in no
way immune to developments in the ‘oil assem-
blage’ and fluctuations in global prices, these
industries remain chiefly local achievements
and, as such, prove difficult to replicate else-
where. The production of bituminous sands
remains likewise limited to Canada. By con-
trast, following the boom of shale gas and oil
production in the USA, we have seen immediate
effects on the dynamics of market pricing,
responses from competing actors such as LNG
suppliers or OPEC to increase output, as well as
growing efforts to exploit similar world deposits
(Bradshaw et al., 2015b; Bridge and Le Billon,
2017; Neville et al., 2017; Stevens, 2010). Sup-
ported by technology transfer, these industries
gradually take the place of more global arrange-
ments, leading to the restructuring of markets. It
is therefore necessary to examine the concrete
cases in which economization is accomplished
in the presence of ‘rival calculative regimes’
(Callon, 2007; Mitchell, 2008), and whether
these solutions are subsequently deemed porta-
ble across disparate resource ontologies and
materialities.
What is particularly intriguing in the case of
unconventionals, however, is the resurgent idea
of speculative gain that fuels such ‘anticipatory
economies’ (Bridge, 2017; Weszkalnys, 2015).
In part, the development of lower-grade fossil
fuels has always been a highly speculative
endeavour, where the life-long ambitions of
geologists and technology developers to evoke
new subsurface resources converge upon
national aspirations of energy sovereignty and
resource-based modernization (cf. Tsing, 2005).
Yet, the current investment frenzy is addition-
ally tied to the quest of firms for capital accu-
mulation via financial markets and their
subsequent ‘liquidification’ by acquisition and
mergers, with the result that they become pro-
gressively decoupled from real-life production.
This has been especially the case in the USA
shale boom since the financial crisis of 2008 and
Wall Street’s renewed interest in productive
sectors (Ko¨k-Kalaycı, 2016; Rogers, 2013;
Mitchell, 2013; see also Ouma, 2014). But
already earlier, the highly speculative nature
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of these industries had become evident with the
infiltration of financial expertise into what used
to be a primarily technical knowledge commu-
nity, as well as the leading role assumed by
independent ‘junior’ developers, both privately
and state-owned, in mobilizing technology
development and licensing of concessions.
Unlike major corporations, these junior firms
are heavily reliant on attracting investment cap-
ital through bonds, public trading and private
equity (cf. Majury, 2014). As Wood (2016)
argues in reference to tight oil, juniors thereby
come to act as ‘proprietary vessels of oil and gas
assets’, turning into objects of market exchange
much like the prospective commodity itself, or
at least insofar as their accumulated resource
holdings continue to uphold future gain. Actual
production is thus often postponed in favour of
short-term profit maximization through the cir-
culation of valuations and financial derivatives,
which are yet to be proven through projected
cash flow from extraction; or as Wood says,
‘they provide a means to liquidate the future
in the present while creating a financial path
dependence on future production’ (2016: 46).
Economization in this regard is not so much
defined by access to energy markets, but above
all to venture capital markets.
It is therefore critical to interrogate the mak-
ing of unconventionals against the financializa-
tion of extractive industries, whereby the
exchange value of purported holdings as pro-
jected earnings becomes inflated far beyond
their use value (Labban, 2010; Zalik, 2015a).
Indeed, the sheer size of organic-rich deposits
may be deployed as a key projective device
(Weszkalnys, 2015), which informs national
energy security strategies and facilitates indus-
try’s access to both concessionary rights and
investments, especially when translated into
monetizable assets as proven and probable
reserves. In practice, however, such projections
of cornucopian futures often fail to match geo-
logical realities following closer exploration.
With the large-scale write-offs of shale gas
reserves that have occurred in the Marcellus
play and more recently in Poland, these claims
to geophysical existence seem to have been laid
bare (Kama and Kuchler, 2019; McGlade et al.,
2013). In fear of market inefficiency, regulators
such as the US Securities and Exchange Com-
mission are now taking steps towards tying
reserve growth back to evidence of actual pro-
duction, whilst still trying to maintain the lax
neoliberal business environment (Pons, 2015).
But even with declining oil prices, such correc-
tions may have little effect in a situation where
industry’s profit margins are predominantly tied
to projections of future market demand and
reserve replacement.
Should unconventional energy development
then be regarded as merely another case of
‘profiting without producing’? It appears that
some evidence of depositional existence and
exploitability is still required in order to materi-
alize even the most speculative industries, and
arguably has always been. As noted earlier, cen-
tral to the ‘economy of appearances’ (Tsing,
2005) that enables the capture of investment
capital in the absence of full-scale production
are strategic ‘retentions’ of purportedly success-
ful, albeit limited experiments with converting
fuzzy geological strata into useable fuels.
Indeed, as Callon reminds us, ‘to produce mer-
chandise from things that are not yet completely
economized, one has to use what exists, edge
one’s way in, articulate’ (2007: 327). My own
research on oil shales (Kama, 2013) shows that
such rhetorical references to already-existing or
foregone projects are often supplemented with
the build-up of tangible evidence, or what Bow-
ker (1994) calls ‘infrastructural work’, which
gives developers a vantage in constituting the
subsoil as a resource. This may include the stra-
tegic exhibition of exploratory drilling data and
laboratory samples of first produce; or the hasty
construction of extraction platforms, processing
plants, pipelines and other ‘capital sinks’; or the
pre-emptive installation of environmental mon-
itoring equipment on concessions. In a way that
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is not dissimilar to the ‘abductive logics’ of anti-
extraction activists described above (Barry,
2013), such infrastructures operate as ‘gestures’
at future prospectivity, which alongside reserve
inventories are not just indispensable in secur-
ing the firm’s value and its liquidity but help to
induce the resource out of mere geologic pro-
pensities and economic conjectures (Wesz-
kalnys, 2015).
These gestures are both performative and
incremental, as they add to the resourceness of
unconventionals as economic assets. Yet, their
success is not guaranteed, since it is far too
common for exploration to become suspended
or indefinitely delayed. The intended evidence
may fail to convince investors, governments
and shareholders alike. Memories of earlier
boom-bust cycles come to inform the deferral
of new projects, replacing high hopes with deep
doubts. The spatio-temporal disjuncture
between existing industries, combined with
depositional heterogeneity, further augments
expert dissensus and public distrust, jeopardiz-
ing the spread of technologies such as fracking.
Meanwhile, however, in the frenzy of expecta-
tions and lucrative deals generated by projected
returns, such anticipatory economies may also
spin off other extractive sectors, without ever
becoming fully realized themselves. Indeed, it
can be hard to tell apart purely fictitious ven-
tures and those aimed at actual production, since
some speculative investments may eventually
materialize whilst others will fail. As ethno-
graphic studies of corporate circles show, such
ambiguities may be present even in a single
company, as different experts forge incongru-
ous temporal strategies that conflict on daily
basis (Kama, 2013; Pons, 2015).
Interestingly, at a time when policy debates
tend to focus on the impacts of impending
exploitation, as if it will indeed happen, many
emergent publics are taking notice of the inher-
ent contradictions and radical openness of such
anticipatory economies. Environmental groups
around the globe now advocate the need to
divest from fossil-dependent futures, having
swiftly adopted the vocabularies of ‘unburnable
carbon’ and ‘stranded assets’ devised by leading
think-thanks (Ayling and Gunningham, 2017;
Healy and Barry, 2017; Zalik, 2015a; see also
Ansar et al, 2013; Carbon Tracker, 2013;
McGlade and Ekins, 2015). The fundamental
aim of the divestment movement is not to iden-
tify more viable means of extraction, but to de-
economize unconventionals outright. This
obfuscates further the boundary between the
economic and non-economic, and productive
and non-productive sectors.
Attending to these (de)economizing strug-
gles does not contradict the tenet that resources
must be regarded as ‘more than economic’
achievements (Bakker, 2012). Quite the con-
trary, if we follow the Callonian idea of ‘eco-
nomic-ness’ as something that neither has
universal modalities nor can be measured
against given parameters, but rather is assem-
bled in tandem with locally-specific resource
ontologies and technologies, then this brings
into focus various affective, embodied and
experimental modes of resource-making (see
Bakker, 2010; Le Billon, 2013; Weszkalnys,
2016). It is precisely these affective engage-
ments, especially the interplay of threats and
promises, which enable unconventionals to be
rendered economically and politically opera-
tional beyond mere geological potency.
VI Conclusions
With this paper, I have identified substantive
new lines of inquiry for geographical studies
of alternative fossil fuel resources in the mak-
ing, by bringing critical resource geographies
into dialogue with recent conceptual trends in
science and technology studies, as well as with
the resurgent interest in the geos across the
social sciences more generally. In doing so, I
argue that we need a more relational and dis-
tributed account of resource-making controver-
sies as ‘collective geo-politics’ (cf. Conway,
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2016), to address both the shifting polities of
geoscientific knowledge and vernacular geopo-
litical engagements with the subsurface. My
approach therefore makes it imperative to con-
duct, in true STS fashion, more in-depth ethno-
graphic and archival research on geoscientific
assessments of resource availability, techno-
economic feasibility and environmental safety,
including how knowledges of specific geologi-
cal basins are translated across disparate metro-
logical and regulatory regimes. Given the
uncertainties at stake, however, it also necessi-
tates an investigation of the ways in which
expert dissensus renders the ontological politics
of resource-making open to wider public inter-
rogation and reconfiguration. It is through these
unfolding spaces of geo-politics that specific
resource futures are rendered actionable and
conventionalized, while others are cast aside.
The value of this perspective is threefold.
First, future research is likely to observe impor-
tant changes in the formation of epistemic
authority around policy-making and regulation
of extractive industries – not just due to con-
flicts between rival forms of expertise, but also
those arising from the ‘abductive’ strategies of
civil society coalitions. It remains to be seen to
what extent these epistemic communities will
be further democratized through the involve-
ment of other extra-industry practitioners, local
experiential knowledges and community-led
monitoring programmes, which in combination
with nascent scholarly experiments around ‘co-
production of knowledge’ may lead to the rise of
entirely novel forms of citizen geosciences (cf.
Irwin, 1995; Jasanoff, 2004). Although the con-
tributions of such experiments are admittedly
still limited, they indicate an important scope
for both transdisciplinary and activist research
beyond the science-policy interface (see also
Jenkins et al., 2015).
Secondly, I noted how the democratic poten-
tial of resource-making controversies is aug-
mented by competing anticipations of the
industries’ prospective gains and unwelcome
risks and strategic retentions of extractive lega-
cies against the backdrop of wider reconfigura-
tion of the carbon economy. Here, the
deliberation of post-conventional energy
futures is clearly defined by the anticipatory
knowledge techniques and public consultation
exercises of various regulatory authorities and
expert bodies, but not exclusively so. For what
is becoming increasingly evident is that the pro-
cess of envisaging and contesting subsurface
potentialities per se is generating new political
agencies, collective identities and forms of
energy citizenship, which can neither be
reduced to the ‘public deficit’ model nor fully
explained by the popular depiction of pro- and
anti-extraction groups. This makes it crucial to
bring STS-led approaches together with the
‘geographies of the future’ (Anderson, 2010),
in order to investigate and to empower the
divergent conceptions of earth futures forged
by the nascent publics arising from geo-social
controversies.
In this context, and thirdly, I have emphasized
the need to analyse anticipatory politics through
the lens of ‘economization’, especially concern-
ing the financialization of extractive industries.
At a time when the ‘transition’ from conventional
to unconventional sources is uncertain, the influx
of financial capital and expertise has led to mul-
tiple, spatio-temporally divergent strategies of
materializing extractive futures in the absence
of globally proven industry. By accounting for
these strategies, research on unconventionals thus
crucially complements the nascent ‘geographies
of marketization’ scholarship concerned with the
reordering of capitalist borderlands in response to
emergent modes of commodity exchange (Berndt
and Boeckler, 2012). As briefly discussed, how-
ever, we must also urgently take notice of alter-
native modes of economization, including
various affective and experimental interventions
by emergent publics, which may serve to ‘de-
economize’ extraction. In turn, this raises impor-
tant questions of power and inequality, as it would
be naı¨ve to assume that divestment groups and
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other ‘economists-in-the-wild’ (Callon, 2007) are
the equal of industry-state allies in performing
anticipatory economies.
An equally crucial task, which exceeds the
scope of this paper, is to explore how the mate-
rialities of fossil fuel resources become co-
constituted with new extractive economies
‘from the outset’ (Braun, 2008: 669), rather than
simply preceding any challenges as ‘biophysi-
cal’ properties inherent to resources – or geo-
physical for that matter (Bakker and Bridge,
2006). Indeed, if we understand resource mate-
rialities as contingent, distributed, and multiple
(Kama, 2013; Richardson and Weszkalnys,
2014), then what are the implications of diverse
enactments of geological potential for the out-
comes of resource assessment, marketization,
and the industries’ transposition across distant
geographies? Conversely, in what ways might
rival appraisals of exploitable resources and
(de)economizing techniques transfigure
resource materials themselves (see also He´bert,
2014)? This shows a pressing need to examine
the role of technology beyond the ‘market
devices’ that mediate the framing of resources
as exchangeable assets and commodities; an
issue that remains curiously overlooked in
STS-led economic sociology (Callon et al.,
2007; C¸alıs¸kan, 2010; C¸alıs¸kan and Callon,
2010). Finally, future research should also
attend to the ‘entanglement of geology and
finance’ (Wood, 2016: 45), given that subsur-
face potentialities are capitalized in the present
whilst delineating the economic regimes that
become possible thereafter. It is unclear to what
extent the recent wave of financialization
becomes decoupled from actual production, and
indeed whether it really differs from preceding
forms of speculation central to any resource-
making endeavours (Ouma et al., 2018). A per-
sisting question for critical geographical
research is therefore how to account for the dif-
ferential capacities of earth materials vis-a`-vis
their progressive shaping through technological
and economic registers and other complex
relations with time. In brief, the conundrum of
unconventionals as liminal and processual
resources-in-the-making requires us to recog-
nize ‘resource temporalities’ (Kama and Wesz-
kalnys, 2017) as equally important to questions
of ontological politics and materialities in our
conceptualization of geo-social controversies.
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Note
1. In technical literature, these are often depicted as a
continuum of fossil fuels with decreasing recovery
potential and energy returns, ranging from crude oils
with higher API gravity and conventional natural gas to
less viscous or permeable sources such as bitumen and
shale-based hydrocarbons, to kerogen-rich oil shales
and gas hydrates (see Bradshaw et al., 2015a). There
are other geo-energy resources which do not fit this
categorization, such as geothermal energy.
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